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Exploring the Canon: Jorge Semprún and the Legacy of Primo Levi 
 
The (im)possibilities for closure in the wake of the traumatic event have been a favoured 
trope of the academy for many years now (amongst others: Caruth, 1995 & 1996; Laub & 
Felman, 1991; LaCapra,  2001). Numerous theories have been advanced whilst notions of 
“working-through” and “acting-out” have become common parlance. Central to these is the 
idea that acts of testimony and of bearing witness are essential for the survivor attempting to 
assimilate their experience. This transference onto the printed page permits the witness to 
acknowledge or indeed register the trauma for the first time and attempt to move beyond that 
event by regaining and imposing his own subjectivity. 
What this paper seeks to explore, via a comparison of Buchenwald revenant Jorge Semprún 
and Auschwitz-Birkenau deportee Primo Levi, is the influence that the writings of the latter 
would have on the former, and in particular the repeated mimicry of one particular motif 
concerning the confusion between reality and dreams, past and present, death and life in the 
immediate days, weeks and months following the liberation or rather, pace Georges Didi-
Hubermann (2008), the “opening of the camps”. Whilst these sensations were common to 
many of those who survived the camps, it is for Semprún’s precise mimicry of the words with 
which Levi chooses to conclude The Truce (1963: 379-80)  and the extent to which it recurs 
throughout Semprún’s oeuvre, that it warrants further consideration. 
Of course the relation between Semprún and his “soulmate” (Brodzki 2007: 181) is, upon 
first inspection, neither concealed nor cryptic. In his novel L’Ecriture ou la vie (1994), 
Semprún devotes an entire chapter to the memory of his discovery that Levi had committed 
suicide. As is typical of Semprún, this particular chapter refrains from narrating one scene. 
Rather, it begins with Semprún’s memory of a Saturday in April (coincidently, if we are to 
believe Semprún, the anniversary of the arrival of American troops at Buchenwald) when he 
was in the midst of writing Netchaïev est de retour (1987). The reader then follows 
Semprún’s weaving memory of the writing of that novel and the unwilled shadow of the 
camps which once again rises to find a place in his récit as he feels his life torn between a 
surface happiness and a profound anguish – ‘a space shared brutally between two lands. Two 
universes, two lives. And, on the spot, I wouldn’t have known how to say which one was real 
and which a dream’ (303).i From this shared space, unannounced and unacknowledged the 
reader is introduced to the first snippet of Primo Levi’s text, The Truce; the line moreover 
which will eventually lead us to the heart of our discussion:  È un sogno entro un altro sogno, 
vario nei particolari, unico nella sostanza... Although this line is offered to the reader in 
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quotation marks, Semprún refuses any acknowledgement that these words are those of Levi. 
Instead Semprún prefers to disguise the words which follow as his own, one sentence amidst 
a much larger discourse on that dreamlike sensation, indeed anguish, of living and dying, life 
and death after Buchenwald. 
 
A dream within another dream, which varies in its detail but of which the form 
remains the same. A dream which can awaken you anywhere: in the calm of the green 
countryside, around a table with friends. Why not with a woman, I may add? 
Sometimes with a lover at the very moment of love. Anywhere, in short, and with 
anyone; but suddenly a diffuse and deep torment, the anguished certitude of the end of 
the world, or of its unreality in any case (304). 
 
Such unacknowledged direct, indirect and allusive citations persist throughout the remainder 
of the chapter (304; 305; 313). Interlinking them all is the overlapping of Semprún’s voice 
with that of Levi; the blurring of his feelings and those of Levi. One final demonstration of 
this intertextual distortion serves to conclude this chapter of L’Ecriture ou la vie and to allow 
us to begin our analysis of the significance of this assumption of language and experience 
which persists throughout much of Semprún’s earlier corpus. And it is with this final, much 
shorter example that Semprún remains most faithful to the original Italian text: 
 
Nulla era vero all’infurio del lager. Il resto era breve vacanza, o inganno dei sensi, 
sogno... 
Nothing was true outside the camp, that’s all. The rest was only a brief pause, an 
illusion of the senses, an uncertain dream: voilà (Semprún: 323; Levi: 379) 
 
With these final lines the chapter, Le Jour de la mort de Primo Levi comes to a close. 
However, given as we shall see the predominance of this motif throughout Semprún’s earlier 
work, it is a chapter which raises numerous questions for both our understanding of Semprún 
and contemporary attempts to situate Semprún within post-war French culture and society 
and that which we may loosely term ‘concentrationary literature’. 
Semprún’s first novel Le Grand Voyage skirts, via its muddled chronology, the edges of the 
memory of Buchenwald via the interminable journey there. Interspersing and imploding on 
that (non-)memory are both childhood recollections and anticipations of events yet to come. 
Notably absent however is the dreamlike confusion between survival and death which comes 
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to pervade Semprún’s later corpus. Indeed it is only four years after the publication of Levi’s 
The Truce that this motif will be first adopted by Semprún in his second novel, 
Evanouissement: 
 
Perhaps this had only been a dream, and not the old anxiety of memory? In any case it 
didn’t matter, since he was not at all certain of having awoken, of having left the 
lifeless stupefaction of the night (1967: 104-105). 
 
Akin to Le Grand Voyage, L’Evanouissement also skirts the edges of the traumatic past from 
a point of relative safety. In both works it is via the alter-egos to whom Semprún loans his 
memory, that Semprún himself avoids the autobiographical ‘I’ in the reliving of the memory 
of deportation. As María Angélica and Semilla Durán (2005: 92)  note: “the subject has not 
yet assumed his own name, he is not yet ready to face the task of reliving the grief of this 
period of his life without the help and the screen of fiction or of a disguise.”  
However, seventeen years after the publication of Le Grand voyage, Semprún in Quel beau 
dimanche!, will assume, under his own name, the memories of Buchenwald. For the first time 
the word ‘roman’ or ‘novel’ will not feature on the cover, and more interestingly, it is in this 
work that dream motif becomes near omnipresent: 
 
Once again the insidious questioning arose. Had I dreamed my life at Buchenwald? 
Or, on the contrary, had my life only been a dream since my return from 
Buchenwald? Had I quite simply died fifteen years ago, and all this [...] was this only 
the dream of a grey premonitory smoke on the hill of Ettersberg?
 
(1980: 67) 
 
At this point, and to spare the reader, it cannot be over emphasised how often this extensive 
confusion between the dream of life and the reality of death surfaces both in Quel beau 
dimanche! and throughout Semprún’s other works.ii  Given moreover that it has been 
borrowed Primo Levi, it is an example of concentrationnary intertextuality which raises 
numerous questions, not only regarding our understanding of Semprún, but also with regard 
to notions of ‘working through’ and ‘acting out’?iii  
To open discussion, it is with the lack of an explicit translation of Levi’s words that we shall 
begin our interrogation; a lack which is particularly puzzling given Semprún’s insistence 
elsewhere that it is the responsibility of the author to never ‘confound’ his reader (2001: 99). 
Indeed in L’Evanouissement, L’Ecriture ou la vie, and Le mort qu’il faut, Semprún asserts his 
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authorial authority to translate Wittgenstein (1967: 66), the conversation between Semprún 
and Lieutenant Rosenfeld (1994: 108), and the conversation between Nikolaï, the 
Stubendienst of Block 56, and a Jehova’s Witness (2001: 139): all for ‘the convenience of the 
reader’ (1994: 237). How then is this specific lack of translation to be understood?  
Throughout his writing the struggle for survival and the suturing and restoration of identity 
was, as has been well documented, one of the chief projects of Semprún. In part this struggle 
was eased by Semprún’s incessant playing, both in the reality of his fiction and in the fiction 
of his reality as a clandestine Communist operative in Franco’s Spain, with the possibilities 
of (his) identity and the adoption or assumption of other personas and alter-egos.
iv
 The 
mimicry of Primo Levi and the adoption of his voice for the articulation of a life that has 
become but a dream in Quel beau dimanche! and Semprún’s other works thus figure, in part, 
as a textual game via which subjective identity and identification may remain hidden. 
Such elusive and allusive elements of Semprún’s work, often figure as a challenge to the 
reader: Colin Davis and Elizabeth Fallaize comment, in relation to La Montagne blanche, on 
Semprún’s ‘self-conscious artifice [which plays] on the knowledge, responses and 
interpretative skills of the reader’ (2000: 71). The reader, they note, is asked to solve the 
riddle via ‘deferred or partial revelation’ so as to grasp the significance of the 
incomprehensible from the dangling threads of information which are offered so coyly for 
inspection: 
 
Through such games with the interpretative competence and cultural knowledge of 
the reader, the text makes hints, gives clues, but holds back from full, unambiguous 
disclosure (71). 
 
Semprún’s refusal to translate the Italian words of Levi, a refusal moreover which goes 
against all other demands to ensure the comprehension of the reader, is one such clue; a 
thread which challenges the reader to trace the dream motif back through previous works, and 
determine for himself its implications. And yet whilst this may at least partly answer the 
question of why Semprún does not translate the citations of Levi, it still does not explain their 
inclusion at all or indeed the dominance of this idea in his preceding works. 
And it is at this point that questions surrounding the importance of the canon, mimesis, 
imitatio, and repetition within testimony truly come to the fore. The phenomenon of mimesis 
may be traced back to the earliest days of antiquity. More often than not, it is translated from 
the Greek as ‘imitation’, and taken to mean a word describing the relation between art, reality 
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and the representation thereof. And yet as Matthew Potolsky points out, the implications of 
this word are infinitely broader; as well as describing artwork, mimesis can describe actions 
such as the imitation of another person, or any number of other “originals”: nature, truth, 
beauty and ideas are all subject to imitation. Perhaps more interestingly for our purpose here, 
mimesis can also be used to describe ‘the relationship between a master and a disciple’ 
(2006: 1). From these, a meagre selection of the possible definitions and interpretations 
offered by Potolsky, it is possible to note that mimesis is furthermore a historical 
phenomenon, with the imitation of any role-model providing a link between past and present; 
this linking imitatio, combined with the ability to create something new out of old traditions 
is a key to literary success, and a powerful means of asserting or indeed creating cultural 
stability whilst ensuring the unity of the past with(in) the present. 
Therefore through his imitation of Primo Levi (and it should be noted his references to over 
600 other cultural figures throughout his oeuvre), it could be argued that Semprún is trying to 
recreate a unifying cultural norm, which, until the First World War at least, extended across 
Europe.
v
 As Davis and Fallaize go on to note: ‘what lies behind this is the nostalgic fantasy of 
a unified European culture common to all, a shared sense of humanity and values’ (2000: 79). 
Thus whilst Auschwitz, following Adorno, may have marked the end of literary tradition and 
convention, Semprún, in his appropriation of Levi, attempts to move beyond Auschwitz in 
the re-creation or re-establishment of cultural and literary tradition, in a genre of writing 
which is exclusively and explicitly located in the very rupture marked by the existence of the 
camps. Though orientated towards the future, it is through the sharing of the past, the 
(re)communication and the (re)appearance of testimony, that Freud’s question at the end of 
Totem and Taboo may be, partially at least, answered.
vi
 Accordingly it is not only the 
imagined rupturing of culture which is subverted via such transmission. By imitating the 
style, prose and motif of Levi, Semprún explicitly in the eponymous chapter, and implicitly 
in the remainder of his works, retransmits key parts of Levi’s thought. And it is via the 
eponymous chapter that Semprún not only reveals the final clue in relation to the mimcry 
present in previous works but, via his re-awakening of those ‘dead’ words, confirms Levi’s 
message. The necessity of such a re-awakening is articulated in La Montagne blanche, 
where-in the principal protagonist Juan Larrea asks ‘when we are all dead, who will still 
believe us? (1986: 42). This fear of the death of memory persists throughout Semprún’s 
work. It is a fear moreover which may be read in both a literal and metaphorical sense 
whence ever since the end of the war, the denial of the Holocaust and its associated crimes 
became increasingly wide-spread in France if not in Europe, before culminating in Robert 
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Faurisson’s publication, ‘The Problem of the Gas Chambers or the Rumour of Auschwitz’ in 
Le Monde; a publication which leant academic credibility to historical revisionism as a 
rigorous school of thought.
vii
 Accordingly, in the creation of a new literary tradition - which 
in Semprún’s case at least we may loosely term as testimony – Semprún fights for the 
preservation of memory espoused by Levi: ‘to fight against amnesia is to fight against power 
[…] for amnesia, whether voluntary or not, can be poisonous to the operation of society’ 
(Semprún in Cortanze 2004: 273). To this end, just as Semprún draws on Levi, so Vidal 
Naquet, in his work denouncing Holocaust denial, draws on the collaboration of Semprún and 
Alan Resnais in La Guerre est finie. There-in he asserts the absolute necessity of memory: 
“my generation, now fifty years old, is more or less the last for whom Hitler’s crime still 
remains a memory. That one must fight against the disappearance – or, worse yet, the 
debasement – of memory seems to me obvious” (1992: 57). The reasons motivating the fight 
against debasement are clear; the fight against the disappearance of memory however perhaps 
warrants further consideration, given the collective and symbolic consequences of the passing 
of the individual survivor: 
 
Each death depletes the world of a variant of that shared experience and makes the 
world a much lonelier place for those who remain. The gap between survivors and 
others inevitably widens when no common reference point exists (Brodzki, 182). 
 
However it is not only to consolidate and preserve Levi’s memory that Semprún exhibits such 
a recurrent reliance on the Jewish writer. Nor can it be said that he seeks exclusively to deify 
the latter. Perhaps most importantly for Semprún, Levi’s writing provides a starting point for 
the articulation of a narrative which is unthinkable, unbelievable, inarticulable and yet, 
simultaneously, inexhaustible (Wiesel & Semprún 1995: 18). It is a starting point for the 
narration of a dream-like experience where-in: 
 
Nothing is fictitious, but the status of the “reality” to which these narratives bear 
“witness” is unimaginable, because it goes beyond any previously known experience. 
Everything is real, but “out of this world,” foreign to customary discourse about the 
world, foreign most of all to conventions useful to the literature of witness (François 
Dominique in Dobbels (ed.) 2003: 169-170).  
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Prototypical of Holocaust narratives, in Semprún’s case such sentiments stem from the 
isolation and shattering of identity enacted upon his sense of identity by deportation and 
internment, the murder of friends, comrades and teachers in Buchenwald, the loss of his 
young mother in 1932, and his later expulsion from the Spanish Communist Party (Herrmann 
2010: 203). Thus an appropriation of Levi allows Semprún to counter those losses and begin 
reconstructing his identity via literary testimony by appropriating the discourse of, amongst 
others, an established quasi-canonical Holocaust writer.  
And yet, this explanation risks grossly oversimplifying Semprún’s writing and thought, since 
between the two authors there exists one fundamental difference: Semprún was deported for 
his role in the French Resistance. Levi was deported for being Jewish. This difference, 
according to Elie Wiesel, was at least in the first instance, of enormous benefit to Semprún:  
 
You knew why you were there, you fought, you resisted. Me, I was a ‘musulman’ as 
we said at the time, I was an object. I didn’t know what was going on (1995: 12). 
 
For the deportee, to be able to give reason to his incarceration was to be able to gain a slight 
psychological advantage in the fight to come to terms with and respond to life and death in a 
concentration camp. This psychological advantage is perhaps most evident in Le Grand 
voyage where-in it is possible to find a great resemblance between large tracts of the text and 
the freedom in resistance espoused by Sartre. To this end Semprún writes: 
 
I have been free to go where I needed to go and I needed to go in this train, because I 
needed to do the things that lead me to this train. I was free to get in this train, 
completely free, and I truly profited from this liberty. I am here freely, because I 
could have not been here (26).  
The historical essence common to us all who have been arrested in this year ’43 is 
freedom [...] I am imprisoned because I am a free man (53-4).
 viii
   
 
By contrast, the Jewish deportee is left without recourse to any such reasoning; Levi recalls 
one of his first encounters with a member of the SS and the empty words spoken to him by 
that guard: “hier ist kein Warum” (1947: 35). There is no why here.  
As advantageous as it may however have been for Semprún to be able to analyse and give 
meaning to his internment in Buchenwald whilst still interned, in the years following the 
opening of the camps, it is precisely for his non-Jewishness that he feels so isolated as he 
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attempts to come to terms with that experience. This alienation manifests itself as one of the 
more polemical comments in Le Grand voyage; following a chance encounter with a Slavic 
Jewess, herself a former deportee, who accuses Semprún of not knowing the extent of Jewish 
suffering in the camps, he makes the following, rather glib, remark: “It’s true, I’ve never been 
Jewish. Sometimes I regret it” (114). Despite being interned in Buchenwald for nearly two 
years, Semprún here expresses an anguish which stems from an inability to speak 
authentically about the camp when to do so would be to impose his own voice on an 
experience which was not, in its most extreme and violent form, his experience. And yet for 
the survivor there remains, regardless of genetic lineage, the desperate, stifling need to 
articulate that experience; a desperate need to be acknowledged and to be heard.
ix
 Thus 
Semprún’s appropriations of Levi may also be read as a claim for authenticity; by aligning 
himself alongside Levi, Semprún endows his own voice with legitimacy and realigns his 
identity with that of an established Jewish voice. 
This alignment of his concentrationary experience of Buchenwald with the Jewish experience 
of Judaeocide is born out with two further examples from Le Grand voyage. One is the first 
and only graphic description of the ‘useless violence’ (Levi 1947) inherent to the camps; this 
lengthy passage concerns the treatment and deaths of around fifteen Jewish children who, 
following the Soviet advances in the east, were ‘evacuated’ from Auschwitz, before arriving 
at Buchenwald after untold days of travelling, the sole survivors of their transport (195-197). 
Although Semprún witnesses, lives, recounts and re-recounts the deaths of so many others – 
Maurice Halbwachs, Maspero, ‘the young German soldier who was singing La Paloma’ to 
name but a few – nowhere else in his writing does the violence come close to matching the 
brutality, confusion and terror of the deaths of these children, notwithstanding traditional 
connotations of innocence which, inevitably, the reader may bring to bear. Thus this passage 
articulates the sense that the Jewish experience – Jewish murder – exceeds in its 
meaninglessness the experience of all other deaths in the camps. As Brodzki (2007: 160) 
writes: 
 
However much he and his comrades had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, a causal 
explanation for their situation and pride associated with it existed […] whereas in this 
transport of Jews […] the narrator witnessed the purest expression of genocidal 
brutality.  
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There is also contained within this passage a deliberate ploy to mitigate the accusations of 
figures such as Claude Lanzmann who criticise the fictionalisation of deportation and 
incarceration on the grounds that literary artifice risks either romanticising the unbearable 
silence and brutality of the univers concentrationnaire, or facilitating the aesthetic privilege 
of the work of art which may itself allow the extraction of pleasure from that same work. This 
passage of Le Grand voyage whilst extremely stylised, and in which the place and artistic 
capabilities of the author are clear, resists both these accusations; the sentences which to 
some degree clearly resemble Proust in their length, structure, and asyndetic coordination in 
no way conjure up a joyful act of memory through which lost time is magically regained. 
Similarly the repetition of ‘les enfants’ which occurs in these few pages no fewer than 
twenty-six times, the repeated references to both ‘la grande avenue’ and the impassive eagles 
of Hitler, the simile comparing the massacre to an old silent film seen at the cinema, all offer 
little aesthetic pleasure to the reader. Rather, they revive and emphasise a pain which it is 
almost too awful to confront, and yet it is a pain which must be confronted and which must 
be revived when ‘after these long years of voluntary amnesia, not only can I recount this 
story, but I must recount it’ (1963: 193). Once again, we approach with this sentence the 
sense of responsibility felt by Semprún (and so many others) for the death of the other, and 
the absolute need to tell of that death (se rendre compte) (1963: 78; 1967: 49) by whatever 
means, stylistic or otherwise, are necessary. Such are the demands of a situation when: 
 
I start to doubt the possibility of telling the story. Not that what we lived through is 
ineffable. It was unliveable, which is something else altogether [...] something which 
does not concern the form of a possible narrative but its substance. Not its 
articulation, but its density [...] Only a masterly narrative will prove capable of 
conveying some of the truth of such testimony. But can one understand everything? 
Imagine everything? (1994: 26) 
 
This narration of death is followed by one of the most perplexing anomalies within 
Semprún’s work. Shortly after the liberation, standing in the approach to the camp which 
prompted this particular memory, Semprún turns and walks toward the gate: “I show my pass 
to the American sentry and I look at the inscription, in big letters of forged iron, which sits 
above the gate. Arbeit macht frei.” (1963: 197) Three simple words. Work sets you free. 
Three words which since the fall of Nazism have come to be and will forever be associated 
with that regime. And yet they have no legitimate place in Semprún’s testimony: for as he 
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himself writes elsewhere, the forged iron words etched into the grill of the entrance gate to 
Buchenwald read ‘Jedem das Seine’ – to each his own, or, to each his due (1994: 373; 1980: 
152-153; 330). 
By thus merging his experience and that of the Jews, Semprún, as we have already argued 
with regard to his appropriation of Levi, searches for an acknowledgement of the 
incomprehensible, unimaginable reality of his experience by merging his experience with 
what remains perhaps the most iconic symbol of the Holocaust. Simultaneously, he 
acknowledges that his experience will never equal the senselessness of the most extreme 
violence of the extermination camps. To draw this distinction between survivors of the camps 
and survivors of the Holocaust, is not to essentialize or hierarchize the victims of suffering. 
Rather, as Brodzki notes, it is “to reinforce a political and historical distinction which has 
great bearing on Semprún’s interpretation of himself as a survivor” (161). Thus, to witness 
that suffering and to align himself not only with it but also with its silent, silenced voices, is 
perhaps a small step towards gaining the recognition, the audience, or indeed the authenticity 
to articulate his experience. Simultaneously the lack of translation of Levi’s text, to which we 
have previously alluded, resists any overly facile comparison. And it is at this point that our 
argument comes full circle, as we return to the question of translation.  
The translation of experience and its transmission are central to the thought of so many 
survivors. The burden of potentially failing to make people understand and consequently 
failing ones obligation to the dead is huge. By falling back on the words of another, Semprún 
in the first instance finds a point of departure for his own attempted articulation, and in the 
second attempts to guarantee that his testimony is not only (re)confirmed and (re)transmitted 
on behalf of Levi, but also understood as his own personal and subjective textual disclosure; 
as Semprún will never know the suffering of the Jews, so too a direct translation of Levi’s 
words would erase, via text, the silence and oblivion which delineate the two groups. 
Moreover a direct translation would impose a limit on the infinite possibilities available to the 
narrator whose subject matter is fundamentally inexhaustible.   
As revealing as this may be however for our understanding of Semprún’s writing, it does 
open up the question of value, both for the reader and Semprún himself. Of what value, for 
the reader attempting to gain a greater insight into the univers concentrationnaire, in a work 
where-in the same discourse is reformulated and repeated? Perhaps, more importantly, of 
what value are such acts of testimony to the survivor who is ineluctably condemned, in the 
‘working-through’ of the experience, to mimic the voice of another in order to ensure that his 
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words are understood? Is Semprún’s adoption or echoing of Levi (amongst, it must be 
stressed, many others) strictly ethical? 
Of these questions, the first may be relatively easily answered by referring to the very 
incomprehensibility of the camps and their purpose. It is of little matter the number of 
testimonies, interviews, or documentaries that the witness-by-proxy reader engages with: at 
the end of his journey, he will be as ignorant as the moment he turned the first page. Of 
course certain works may articulate certain ideas with more aplomb than others; some may 
approach the camps from a philosophical perspective; some may be based purely in fact; yet 
others may be wholly invented. The possible approaches to the subject remain infinite. And 
yet at the end, the impassable void of death and the demise of the other is reached. This event 
can be described one thousand times over, and yet its fundamental truth as an event external 
to the reader’s (and writer’s) life can never be grasped. As Maurice Blanchot has written, 
dying in its particularity is not shareable, even as it is also what each subject has in common 
with other human beings (1995: 23). It is for this that Semprún (following Levi once again) 
writes that whilst the ‘ineffable’ is nought but a lie, an alibi and a sign of laziness, the 
impossibility of communication itself is a truth: once again, we are approaching a rupture; 
this time however it is not culture that has been torn in two by the camps; rather it is a rupture 
between those who lived to return from the camps and their subsequent encounters with ‘men 
from before, from the outside, emissaries from life – [bearing] a stunned, almost hostile, and 
certainly suspicious look in [their] eyes’ (1994: 26-27). Thus from testimony it is not 
enlightenment per se that the reader should seek. Rather, and paradoxically, it is an 
acceptance of the absolute incomprehensibility of death, and simultaneously the implications 
of survival (and the guilt associated therewith) that should be sought.  
To answer the second question Dominick LaCapra, distinguishes between two modes of 
remembrance and testimony. The first, ‘acting-out’, is based on repetition and the repetition 
compulsion. For people who have undergone a trauma, this compulsion may be evidenced as 
an inescapable reliving of the past, as the event is repeated time and again in psychic 
nightmares and flashbacks, or in the physical realm, as a remembrance occasioned by words, 
smells and tastes. Importantly it is not only the initial victim who may discover himself acting 
out a traumatic event, but any two characters implicated in the Oedipal scene, and in later 
life, of transference and repetition. Beyond the chief protagonists of this scene as outlined by 
Freud it is possible to posit that such transference also occurs between master and disciple. 
Indeed as LaCapra points out, it is perhaps inevitable that when any subject is studied, and in 
particular a subject of the emotional and traumatic gravitas of the camps, there is a tendency 
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to repeat the very problems being studied (2001: 142). To this we should add that such a 
tendency can only be exacerbated when the desire for identification with the victim and the 
valorisation of their work proceeds, for whatever reason, unchallenged and unimpeded.  
Semprún’s appropriation of this one motif of Levi is of course repetitive; in no small part is it 
a disciple’s imitation of the master. However, it is not compulsive – Semprún remains at all 
times in charge of his text, and the imitation there-in is a deliberate ploy which allows him to 
live vicariously and contain within his own ‘acting-out’ the experience of Levi.x At this point 
it should be emphasised that this vicarious living, and excessive identification or empathy 
concerns only the return to life in the years following the liberation of the camp – Semprún 
explicitly states that, as a strategy for survival and to avoid confusing the experience of other 
deportees with his own, he deliberately avoided reading any other first-hand accounts of 
internment (1994: 305). Indeed as we have already noted, despite the plethora of cultural 
references present throughout Semprún’s corpus, Levi is the only author, let alone survivor, 
to have an entire chapter devoted to his life, writing and death. As importantly, it is worth 
noting that although Semprún would go on to discuss deportation, in person, with a revenant 
as notable as Elie Wiesel, he explicitly refused all opportunities to meet with Primo Levi 
(318):  
 
I felt no need to meet [him]. I mean: to meet him outside, in the exterior reality of this 
dream that life had become ever since our return. I felt that between us everything had 
already been said. Or had now become impossible to say. I found it unnecessary, 
perhaps even improper, for us to have a conversation between survivors, a dialogue of 
the rescued. And anyway had we really survived?
xi
 
 
Improper and unnecessary: two reasons given by Semprún for refusing to meet with Levi. To 
these reasons one may question a further possibility – would such an encounter have rendered 
the dream of death within the dream of life only too real? Through his writing, living Levi’s 
dream of death and the dream of the Lager as his truth, Semprún vicariously and immortally 
lives and works through the dream-of-death-that-is-life experience of those who returned and 
wrote of their difficulties in coming to terms with their experience, without succumbing to 
the pressures experienced when he first attempted to bear witness:  
  
Whilst writing tore Primo Levi from his past [...] it thrust me back into death, 
drowning me in it. I choked in the unbreathable air of the manuscript: every line I 
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wrote pushed my head underwater as though I were once again in the bathtub of the 
Gestapo’s villa. I struggled to survive. I failed in my attempt to speak of death in 
order to reduce it to silence: if I had continued, it would have been death, in all 
probability, that would have silenced me (1994: 322). 
 
Empathetic imitation and identification with Levi help to circumvent this possibility. For 
whilst the focus of Le Grand Voyage remains the transport to the camp, it is only in Quel 
beau dimanche!, which oscillates between internment and the years following the war, and 
L’Ecriture ou la vie, which takes as its theme the difficulties of the ‘return to life’, that the 
most significant paraphrasing of Primo Levi begins to occur. It is this, the return to life which 
Semprún, through Levi, lives as the partial experience of another: it is a vicarious process 
which allows him critical distance and perspective on the belated effects of the traumatic 
event as they affect the individual; a process which thus offers him a means to work through 
his own experience by living, appropriating, and re-writing the experience of another.  
Semprún thus haunts and is haunted by Levi. Levi’s suicide in 1987 however will change 
that. From that moment, Semprún, with the death of his surrogate-self, emerges into the 
reality of a life that is real; a life marked with finitude by the joyful presence of death’s 
shadow where-in the illusory life-that-is-already-death outside the camps has been left, at 
last, behind. ‘Suddenly the announcement about the death of Primo Levi, the news of his 
suicide, changed my perspective. I became mortal once more’ (1994: 319). It is this critical 
distance which is the key to LaCapra’s notion of working-through, and thus gaining a belated 
comprehension of the past: 
 
In acting out, one relives the past as if one were the other, including oneself as another 
in the past – one is fully possessed by the other or the other’s ghost; and in working 
through, one [acquires] some critical distance that allows one to engage in life in the 
present, to assume responsibility – but that doesn’t mean that you utterly transcend the 
past. It means that you come to terms with it (148). 
  
Finally as to the last question regarding the ethical justification of such a presumption of 
identity, this is a much more difficult question to answer, and for that reason one that we shall 
not attempt to answer here, except perhaps by leaving the last word to Primo Levi. Though 
speaking in relation to the Sonderkommando of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the weight and 
implications of these words far transcend their original focus: 
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Each individual is so complex an object that there is no point in trying to foresee his 
behaviour, all the more so in extreme situations [. . .] Therefore I ask that we meditate 
on [their] story [. . .] with pity and rigour, but that a judgement of them be suspended 
(1989: 43). 
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i
 Nb this and all subsequent page references refer to the original French texts.  
ii
 Amongst others, see Semprún 1980: 110-11; 131; 157; 193-194; 221; 415.  Semprún 1986: 
110; 199; 223. Semprún 1987: 37. Semprún 1994: 21; 24. 
iii
 This is not intended to dispute that Semprún himself had the sensation that life was but a 
dream after Buchenwald. Rather it is to question why his vocabulary and style of writing 
mimic so closely the words of Primo Levi. 
iv
 To name but a few: Gérard or Manuel of Le grand Voyage; Manuel of L’Evanouissement; 
Juan Larrea of La Montagne blanche; Federico Sanchez of Autobiographie of Federico 
Sanchez. All these characters, partly fictionalised, partly located in the reality of underground 
missions undertaken for the Communist Party, contain fragments of Semprún himself. 
v
 ‘Until the First World War, everybody made the same journeys. It was the same Europe for 
everyone.’ (1986: 68-9). As such, Semprún’s writing is built into and within European 
culture, containing references to, amongst others, Proust, Goethe, Kafka, Merleau-Ponty, 
Sartre, Wittgenstein, Bizet, Heidegger, Levinas, Husserl, Camus, Aragon, Brasillach, Drieu 
La Rochelle, Shakespeare, Baudelaire, and Beethoven. See http://francoise-
kroichvili.perso.neuf.fr/auteurs%20cites%20par%20J%20Semprun.htm [accessed 03/06/15] 
for a comprehensive list of more than 650 authors, artists and other notables referenced, 
however obliquely, by Semprún. 
vi
 “What are the ways and means employed by one generation in order to hand on its mental 
states to the next one?” (Freud 1990: 158). 
vii
 Cf. Deborah Lipstadt (2004) for a detailed account of the phenomenon of Holocaust denial. 
viii
 Cf. Sartre 1947: pp. 11-14.  Although it falls outside the scope of this essay it is perhaps 
also interesting to consider the correlation between community, fraternity and resistance to 
torture that is also evident in both Semprún, Sartre and of course Robert Antelme: Sartre 
1947: 13; Semprún 1967: pp. 44-45; Antelme 1947) . 
ix
 Though one may wish to question the possibility of being “heard”; Robert Antelme recalls 
the woefully inadequate reactions of the first American soldiers to reach Dachau: ‘Frightful, 
yes frightful’ (1947: 301). 
x
 ‘It’s me who’s writing this story and I’ll do as I want (Semprún 1963: 26); ‘I am the 
cunning God the Father of all these threads’ (Semprún 1980: 11). In this last citation it is also 
worth noting the play on words in the original French, whereby ‘fils’, here translated as 
threads in relation to the interwoven stories of Semprún’s récit, could equally mean ‘sons’ in 
a reference to the variety of personas adopted by Semprún in the “story” of his life. 
xi
 Semprún 1994: 318. In this citation it is also possible to isolate a potential further echoing 
of Levi, whose poem of 1945, Buna concludes: “If we were to meet again // In that world 
sweet beneath the sun // With what kind of face would we confront each other?” (1988: 5) 
